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The desire of workers to engage in moonlighting, a phenomenon of multiple job-holding is a 
reflection of some of the changing labour market outcomes. Public sector workers who 
suffered loss of jobs through public sector retrenchment and privatisation as part of Ghana’s 
economic reform resorted to holding more than one job to earn enough to avert any 
substantial drop in their living conditions. Despite the seemingly conspicuous existence of 
multiple job-holding in Ghana, much remains to be learnt about its determinants and 
characteristics of the phenomenon. This article employs the probit regression estimation 
technique based on the two most recent nationwide household surveys conducted in 1998/99 
and 2005/06 to investigate the main determinants of moonlighting in Ghana. It provides 
empirical evidence to suggest that personal and household characteristics as well as location 
and labour market characteristics such as individual earnings and hours spent in the main job 
significantly influence an individual’s desire to engage in more than one job. The study 
concludes that apart from the financial motive that drives an individual’s decision to 
moonlight, the engagement of moonlighting on account of lower working hours in the 
individual’s main job could be a symptom of visible or time-related underemployment.   
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1. Introduction  
Ghana’s economic reforms initiated in 1983 have left scores of changes in 
the Ghanaian labour market. Major elements of the reforms include restructuring 
of wages, privatization of state enterprises and retrenchment of the public sector 
workforce. Most workers who suffered retrenchment and privatisation sought 
refuge in other sectors of the economy and had to resort to moonlighting to keep 
them at an income level closer to what it was prior to the reform since their 
earnings in the new primary job were lower than before. Moonlighting, also 
referred to as multiple job-holding is commonly understood as having a second 
or a third job, usually part-time, in addition to a primary full-time job (Betts, 
2006). Shishko and Rostker (1976) also define moonlighting as a situation 
where an individual maintains primary employment and engages in additional 
work for pay. The inclusion of a requirement that the moonlighting activity be 
paid employment distinguishes it from hobbies and other vocations and interests 
(Perrella, 1970).  
People engage in moonlighting for various reasons such as ensuring 
continuous employment spells even in times of reduced working hours in the 
main job, overcoming financial constraints, and for accumulation of skills and 
expertise in other occupations. One could describe the first motive of 
moonlighting as a symptom of time-related underemployment which measures 
the individual’s availability and desire to work more hours if he or she works 
less than the normal hours stipulated for the work. Whilst some schools of 
thought believe that the phenomenon the moonlighting stems from a constraint 
on the number of hours an individual can work or rigidity on the main job 
(Shishko & Rostker, 1976), others share the view that workers do so to balance 
their job portfolio and supplement incomes under conditions of financial 
necessity (see Allen, 1998; Krishman, 1990). Beyond survival motive, people 
also engage in multiple economic activities as a means of capital accumulation 
(Owusu, 2001). 
Evidence of moonlighting has been established in Ghana (Owusu, 2001, 
and 2005; Maxwell et al., 2000). Estimates from the Ghana Living Standards 
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Surveys indicate that about 18% of workers in Ghana were engaged in more 
than one job in 2005/06 dropping from 30% in 1998/99. This is generally high 
compared to 10.0% in the UK in 1998 (Böheim and Taylor, 2004), 10.1% in 
Russia in 1996, 6.2% in the US in 1989 and 5% in Brazil in 1999 (ILO, 2004). 
A number of factors have been identified globally to influence the decision to 
hold multiple jobs including employment type tends to suffer the brunt of 
moonlighting, and the characteristics of multiple job-holders. This paper thus 
seek to investigate the underlying triggers of moonlighting in Ghana with 
specific emphasis on the relevance of hours constraint effect as indication of 
visible underemployment and financial motivation of holding additional job.  
We refer to individual workers who were engaged in more than one job at the 
same time during the reference period as moonlighters. The study applies a 
binary regression model (probit) to two nationally representative household 
surveys to provide quantitative analysis of the determinants of moonlighting. 
Empirical evidence of the article suggests the importance of hours constraint and 
financial motivation in multiple job-holding in Ghana.  
The study is motivated largely by the relatively sparse economic literature 
on moonlighting particularly in Africa. Even though some related studies on 
moonlighting have been carried out in a few African countries such as Tanzania, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon and Ghana (see e.g. Gaag et al., 1989; Owusu, 2005) a 
quantitative analysis that links moonlighting with relevant triggers has not been 
well established particularly in Ghana.  Using binary regression approach to 
establish quantitatively the determinants of moonlighting in Ghana, this paper 
attempts to add to the existing stock of empirical work on moonlighting. It will 
also provide a source of empirical evidence for policy makers in relation to the 
sources of moonlighting, particularly its linkage with time-related or visible 
underemployment in Ghana. 
The paper is structured into five sections. The conceptual framework and 
the theoretical and empirical literature survey are discussed in section two after 
the introductory section. Section three focuses on methodology and data sources, 
followed by empirical discussion in section four. Section five presents the 
summary and conclusion of the paper. 
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2. Conceptual Framework and Literature Survey  
Multiple job-holding or moonlighting arises when individuals work in 
more than one job at the same time. According to Shishko and Rostker (1976), 
an individual is considered a multiple job-holder or said to be moonlighting if he 
or she maintains primary employment and engages in additional work for pay.  
Normally in the discussion of secondary job-holdings, two types of additional 
work are considered: working at a second formal job or engaging in individual 
(self employed) economic activity, i.e. formal and informal secondary work.  
There are two main definitions of a moonlighter and these are the point 
definition and the duration definition (see Boateng, 1996). The point definition 
considers the worker at a particular point in time, and classifies the worker as a 
moonlighter if more than one job is held during the reference period. This 
definition does not consider the period over which the two jobs have been held 
simultaneously. The problem with this approach is that it includes in its 
definition of moonlighters individuals who might be holding transitional jobs 
and who have no intention of keeping both or all jobs simultaneously. Thus, this 
definition tends to overestimate the number of moonlighters and the incidence of 
the phenomenon of moonlighting in the population. This tends to be the 
approach used in studies relying on census-type data where the information 
about jobs pertains mostly to the survey reference week (see Shishko and 
Rostker, 1976). Using the duration definition on the other hand, the worker is 
observed over a time interval, and if more than one job is held during the entire 
period then the individual is considered as a moonlighter. In Krishnan (1990), 
for example, moonlighters were tracked over a period of nineteen weeks to 
ensure that both jobs were held during the entire sample period, while the self 
employed and those who held unpaid family jobs were excluded.  
Relevant theories underlying individual behaviour linked to multiple job 
holding are fundamentally drawn from the economic theories of labour supply. 
Economic theories of labour supply derive the motivations for moonlighting 
from the basic work-leisure choice theory. The theory views individuals as 
optimising agents with the aim of maximising utility subject to a fixed time 
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endowment and resource constraint. The theory further hypothesises that the 
fixed time can be allocated to either time in the market, or work that yields 
income and satisfaction or time at home, or leisure which produces satisfaction 
but yields no income. Berman and Cuizon (2004) underscore the significance of 
some key assumptions that underlie the utility maximizing behaviour of 
individuals. These are the assumption that individuals have a given set of choice 
preferences, they are utility-maximisers with no market power in the market and 
the supply of work opportunities is elastic. 
Traditionally, moonlighting behaviour focuses on the difference between 
desired hours and actual or scheduled hours on one hand, and primary wages 
and moonlighting wages on the other (Perlman, 1966; Shishko and Rostker, 
1976). Two main arguments underpin the decision to moonlight i.e. individuals 
choose to work in more than one job either because they are hours constrained in 
their primary job (hours constraint view) or they seek heterogeneous jobs (job 
portfolio argument).  
 
2.1 Hours Constraint View of Leisure-Choice Theory 
The first motivation-hours constraint- posits that an individual may be 
constrained in the number of hours that can be spent in the primary job and this 
consequently limits earnings capacity from that job. According to the standard 
labour-leisure model, employees may be willing to work more but are not being 
offered the chance to do so in their primary occupation (Perlman, 1966).  In 
response to the employer’s inability to offer enough hours on the primary job, 
the individual may choose to take a second job to achieve the desired income 
level (Conway and Kimmel, 1998). Shishko and Rostker (1976) argue that firms 
often offer a fixed hours and wage employment package. As such if the number 
of hours a firm offers diverges from the optimal number of hours that a utility 
maximising worker would choose at the going wage, then a strong tendency 
exists for moonlighting under the condition that the second job pays more than 
the worker’s reservation wage on that job. This is regarded as the hours 
constraint motivation for holding multiple jobs. 
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Figure 1: Utility Maximising Hours-Constrained Moonlighter 
Source: Dickey et.al. (2009) 
 
Consider Figure 1, where Y is non-labour income, 1W and 2W  are the 
wages paid in the first and second job respectively, T denotes total time 
available, 1H  is the fixed hours of work in the first job, and 2H  is the time spent 
in a second job.  As a utility maximiser, the individual would like to work 
)( 21 HHT   hours on his first job in order to reach utility level
I , but cannot 
work more than 1H  hours because s/he is hours constrained. The decision to 
moonlight then depends on the wage offered in the second job. The second-job 
reservation wage is determined by the utility level I1 given at the intersection of 
the first-job wage line and the allowable hours 1H . If the wage offered exceeds 
the reservation wage, the constrained worker will take a second job that makes 
him better off (i.e., I* utility curve). In essence, if the worker is constrained on 
the primary job, then 1H  is no longer a choice variable and the only option is to 
seek more working hours from a second job. 
 
2.2 Job Portfolio Motive of Leisure-Choice Theory 
The Job Portfolio Motive on the other hand is premised on the fact that 
there is a personal preference for job differentiation. Thus under this scenario, 
individuals may decide to allocate their working time between two or more jobs 
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not because there is a market constraint on their desired hours in any given job, 
but because they seek to allocate their working time among alternative 
employments or diversify their job portfolio. The second motivation thus 
recognises that the hours of labour supplied to the two jobs may not be perfect 
substitutes. Individuals may choose to work in a second job for reasons that are 
not connected to the primary job’s hours of work or earnings (Böheim and 
Taylor, 2004). For instance, an individual may have a second job to learn about 
new occupations or acquisition of new skills, or to gain experience in alternative 
occupations (Heineck and Schwarze, 2004); or to smooth their consumption; or 
as an alternative to precautionary savings even if they are not experiencing 
immediate negative financial shocks (Guariglia and Kim, 2004a); or to maintain 
flexible work schedules such as women who have young children and holding 
two part-time jobs that suit their time-allocation needs of arranging child care 
instead of one full-time occupation (Heineck, 2003); or to gain job satisfaction 
not received from the primary job referred to as the heterogeneity motive of 
moonlighting (see for example Renna and Oaxaca, 2006).  
Figure 2 shows the situation of a worker who is not constrained in the 
main job and can work any amount of hours 1H  that fall in the given standard 
working time span  1HT  . Work in a second job might nevertheless be 
supplied, if the wage paid at least maintains the individual’s utility level 1I . This 
wage, however, has to be higher than the one paid in the first job. Assuming that 
hours of work on the second job 2H  is a choice variable, it can be argued that 
the individual facing this situation would aim at working more hours in the 
moonlighting job. However, due to the possible heterogeneous character of the 
two jobs, there are other likely reasons that drive the individual to supply labour 
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Figure 2: Utility Maximising Non Hours-Constrained Moonlighter   
Source: Dickey et.al. (2009) 
 
Despite the divergent motives underlying the moonlighting decision, 
Dickey et al. (2009) identified three key reasons to explain why an individual 
may not moonlight: first, either the individuals are not interested in 
moonlighting, or second, either they would like to moonlight but cannot find a 
second job with attractive features; and third, the individuals would like to 
moonlight but cannot find employment. Possible reasons why one individual 
cannot find employment in a second job and another individual can are twofold. 
First, observed moonlighters may be more informed or more engaged in the job 
market, which allows them to identify job opportunities, or they could be more 
aggressive in their job search. Second, multiple-jobholding is the outcome of a 
two-step process: an individual queues for a second job, and the employer hires 
the individual from a pool of applicants. By implication moonlighters and non 
moonlighters may differ in their attractiveness to employers. Multiple job-
holding might also occur when jobs are heterogeneous and not perfect 
substitutes (Conway and Kimmel, 1998). This adds to the notion of constraints 
in the primary job hours. They propose that labour supply is more elastic than 
usually assumed, once moonlighting is acknowledged in the labour supply 
behaviour, and that there is presence of multiple motives for dual jobholding, 
 
184  © 2013 The Author(s). African Review of Economics and Finance, Vol 4, No. 2, June 2013. 
 
even though findings show that hours constraint is still the most common 
motive. 
The phenomenon of moonlighting may be deemed to be desirable or a 
symptom of labour market challenge depending largely on the motive that drives 
one’s decision to moonlight. Individual worker’s decision to take up an 
additional job with the view to acquiring new skills or gaining experience in 
alternative occupation (Heineck and Schwarze, 2004) to enhance his/her labour 
market mobility or ensure continue  employment spell in against potential 
challenges of lay off in the primary job could be described as rational. In 
addition, employees’ decision for a second job in order to smooth their 
consumption, or as an alternative to precautionary savings even if they are not 
experiencing immediate negative financial shocks (Guariglia and Kim, 2004b) 
cannot be described as a negative move. Furthermore, moonlighting decision 
motivated by job heterogeneity (based on the desire to obtain different 
satisfaction from the primary and other jobs such as singing in a band during the 
evening (Böheim and Taylor, 2004) is equally good.  These underlying reasons 
for moonlighting are in line with the job portfolio motivation of moonlighting. 
In contrast, hours constraint or lower earnings that provide a trigger for 
moonlighting may constitute a labour market challenge that requires policy 
action.  
Some negative consequences associated with moonlighting including 
potential conflicts between the demands of the worker’s primary and secondary 
jobs and the potential negative health impact of working long hours due to 
multiple jobs (ILO, 2004) with declining productivity effects.  In effect, 
considering the possible cost associated with moonlighting, its desirability and 
socioeconomic significance is undermined if it is driven by the hours constraint 
as a symptom of underemployment or financial constraint on account of low 
earnings in primary job relative to household basic consumption expenditure. 
Thus, engaging in moonlighting under compelling circumstances from 
insufficient workings hours and lower earnings in primary job bearing in mind 
potential disadvantages cannot be deemed as desirable.   
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2.3 Empirical Review 
To date the economics literature on multiple jobholding has largely 
centred on developed country data. Early theoretical works focused only on the 
hours constraint aspect of moonlighting. However, recent studies provide mixed 
results in support of the two main views, hours constraint and job portfolio 
motivations.  Shishko and Rostker (1976) found that the labour supply becomes 
more elastic to changes in the wage rate after accounting for the decision to 
moonlight as a response to an hours constraint on the primary job. According to 
them, the hours spent in the secondary job increase with the secondary job wage 
rate and decrease with the primary job earnings, suggesting a financial 
motivation for multiple job-holding. Furthermore, increases in the earnings and 
hours worked in the primary job have a negative effect on secondary job hours.  
Heineck (2003), using data from the United Kingdom, found evidence for 
the two most prominent motives for moonlighting. One is the usual hours 
constraint where individuals who would like to work more hours or are not 
satisfied with the total pay of their primary occupation are more likely to take a 
second job. Another is the heterogeneous jobs motive where individuals may 
hold on to their primary job for the sake of stability and security, and take a 
second job that provides monetary benefits, complementarities to the primary 
job, and additional skills outside those in the current job. In a similar study, 
Paxson and Sicherman (1996) found evidence to support the hours constraint 
motivation and confirmed that dual job holding is a dynamic process.  Their 
study revealed that dual jobs and job change are used to adjust hours of work 
simply because evening and weekend hours are not available in their main job 
occupation. In a further study by Casari (2010) for urban and rural workers in 
Brazil, evidence was found to support the hours constraint motivation but adds 
that heterogeneity in occupation and stability contribute to increased labour in 
the secondary labour market.  
The evidence that multiple job holding necessarily rises with the level of 
education has also been empirically established. For instance, Foley (1997) 
focusing on transitional economies with specific emphasis on Russia showed 
that education nearly doubles the moonlighting probability. Foley also provided 
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evidence to indicate that men, urban residents and higher educated individuals 
have the highest secondary employment rates. Tansel (1995) confirmed the 
significant relationship between moonlighting and education with an evidence of 
a strong positive effect of education on moonlighting in Turkey. In addition, the 
phenomenon is also found to increase with labour market experience, and 
decreases with primary job earnings and that having a working wife decreases 
the probability of moonlighting while wage earners are more likely to moonlight 
than self-employed (Tansel, 1995). Thus, whereas wage earners are hours 
constrained, the self-employed are able to adjust their hours on the primary main 
job and therefore less likely to hold a second job. Casari (2010) also revealed 
that income from the main job was inadequate even for workers with more 
schooling, suggesting that multiple job holding necessarily rises with the level of 
education in Brazil.  
Gaag et al. (1989) found that moonlighting is much more prevalent 
among civil servants than among wage earners in the private sector in Cote 
d’Ivoire. In terms of age and education the differences between the two groups 
of employees are fairly small. Women were less likely to have a second job in 
Cote d'Ivoire and most second jobs were in self-employment. 
Similarly, Averett (2001) explored the incidence and reasons for 
moonlighting behaviour with a focus on gender differences. Using a bivariate 
probit model of the decision to work and the decision to hold more than one job, 
she found that there is no substantive difference in the factors that influence 
males and females to moonlight. This is contrast to the findings of Gaag et al. 
(1989) for women in Cote d'Ivoire. 
Flourishing urban informality as livelihood strategy can also be explained 
within the context of moonlighting. In Cameroon, urban agriculture remains an 
important livelihood strategy for resident in the city of Bamenda, particularly 
among the lower income class with the middle class involved in the shipping 
container business (Ojong, 2011). Income generated from multiple economic 
activities in the informal economy is used for smoothening in the household. 
Similarly, Maxwell et al. (2000) found that in Ghana, about 6% of individuals 
and 15% of households in Accra engaged in some kind of urban agricultural 
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activities. As noted by Owusu (2007), informal economy has become an avenue 
for ‘part-time’ employment for formal sector employees and as a source of 
additional income for many people with fulltime employment in the formal 
sector. This suggests that mere formalisation of informal economic activity is 
not necessarily the panacea (Adaawen and Jørgensen, 2012) to solving the 
challenges facing informal economy operators and congestions in the cities. The 
practice of multiple economic activities has also become a means of capital 
accumulation by the not-so-poor segment of the population (Owusu, 2001). 
In Ghana, the practice of multiple is observed to be more prevalent in the 
public sector than the private formal sector due partly to strict supervision and 
higher wages in the latter which make the general environment less conducive 
for such activities (Owusu, 2001). In the public sector, teachers were found to 
have highest participation rate in multiple economic activities while doctors are 
the least likely to engage in multiple activities because of availability of 
overtime opportunities within their formal employment (Owusu, 2005). Drawing 
on case studies of two medium-sized towns in Ghana and nationally 
representative sample data, he concludes that multiple livelihood strategies is 
becoming “the way of doing things” for many urban salary employees (Owusu, 
2000).  On their part, Maxwell et al. (2000) in a survey of urban livelihood in 
Accra observed that about two-thirds of households in Accra had engaged in at 
least two income generating activities in previous 30 days. 
 
 
3. Methodology and Data Sources 
3.1 Model Formulation and Estimation Strategy 
The quantitative specification and estimation procedure involves the 
formulation and estimation of a model of moonlighting that links multiple job-
holding with independent variables that describe the worker’s personal, 
household, location and labour market characteristics. The dependent variable is 
whether the individual worker is engaged in more than one job. It is measured in 
a dichotomous form and takes a value of 1 if the individual holds more than 1 
job and 0 if he or she is engaged in one job. The model is generally specified as: 
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  'XY         (1) 
Where Y is a vector of values representing the dependent variable; X is a 
vector of explanatory variables that affect the individual’s decision to 
moonlight; β is a vector of parameters of the control variables and ε is the 
standard vector representing the stochastic error term. 
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, we employ the probit 
regression estimation technique to explore how each of the explanatory variables 
influences the probability of a worker engaging in moonlighting. Equation (1) is 
therefore specified as  
 )......,.........,|1Pr()|1Pr( 21 ki XXXJXY     (2) 
where Y is the dependent variable and Xi denotes the set of explanatory 
variables. Assuming that the model is linear in the set of parameters, βi, 























 i   
(3) 
where G is a function taking on values strictly between 0 and 1; and εi 
denotes the disturbance term with mean zero and variance 2 . The disturbance 
term captures measurement errors and all unobserved factors. 
The alternative to the choice of probit estimation technique is the logit. 
The choice between logit and probit is usually with regards to the assumptions 
about the distribution of the error term. Though both yield similar results, 
whereas the probit model assumes a normal distribution for the error term that of 
the logit assumes a logistic distribution. The probit model is chosen over the 
logit because it is fairly simple to understand in terms of interpreting its 
marginal effects and also since the study ascertains the individual’s probability 
of engaging in a moonlighting activity, it is preferred.  
Following from equation (3) we specify the main probit estimation model 
for empirical analysis of the determinants of moonlighting as 
Ji  =  0 + i P + i H + i  Loc + i  LM +    (4)
where J the  is dependent variable which takes a value of 1 when the  individual 
holds more than one job and 0 if the individual is engaged in only one job. The 
sample covers individuals aged 15 years1 and above who are employed.   
                                                            
1  The minimum wage for admission to employment or work in Ghana and in line with the ILO Convention 
No. 138 
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The explanatory variables are grouped into four categories. P is a vector 
of personal characteristics (i.e. age, age squared, sex, marital status, education). 
Age is measured in years and meant to capture the influence of one’s age on the 
decision to moonlight while the age squared is introduced to capture the 
convexity or concavity in respect of the relationship between age and multiple 
job-holding. Sex of the worker captures female-male differences regarding 
moonlighting decision and enters the model as male dummy with a value of 1 
assigned for male workers and 0 for female workers. A married dummy (with a 
value of 1 assigned if the worker is married or in consensual union and 0 for 
those are single) enters the model to measure the effect of one’s marital status on 
the probability of engaging in moonlighting. The effect of the worker’s 
educational status is introduced into the model in the form of a set of four 
categorical variables, i.e. basic (the individual has some or completed 9 years of 
education), secondary (the individual has some or completed secondary 
education), tertiary (the individual has some or completed a level of tertiary 
education) education with “no education” as the reference dummy).       
H is a vector of household characteristics variables such as household size 
measured by the number household members and poverty status of the 
household introduced as a dummy variable. Workers from households that live 
below the national upper poverty line are assigned a value of 1 and those from 
households that live above the national upper poverty line and considered to be 
non-poor are assigned a value of 0 (i.e. poor 1: non-poor 0). The introduction of 
poverty status in the model is meant to capture the effect of working poverty 
(i.e. individual worker who is a member of a household that lives below the 
national poverty line) on moonlighting decision of workers. 
Loc represents a vector of location dummies categorised into Accra (the 
capital city of the country) and other urban location with rural as the reference 
dummy. This is meant to capture the rural-urban differences in moonlighting 
decision of workers. Indeed, the rural labour market structure differs from that 
of urban structures in terms of wage levels, transportation systems and the 
propensity for part-time work (Monk and Hodge, 1995). Generally, rural areas 
have narrow industrial bases, smaller numbers of employers, and higher levels 
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of self-employment (Hodge et al., 2002). Rural-urban differences in labour 
market structure are also reflected in the differences in employment 
opportunities and options available to workers as well as the efficiency of 
institutional mechanisms on disseminating job-related information. In some 
cases, moonlighting among farm households in rural areas arises as a result of 
variability of farm incomes (see, for example, Tailor et al., 1995; Mather and 
Scopilliti, 2004). 
LM denotes a vector of labour market variables such as time spent in the 
main job per week measured in hours, monthly earnings in the main job (in 
nominal terms) measured in logs, experience in the main job measured in years, 
and a dummy of employment type. The hours of work in the main jobs which is 
one of the variables of interest in the model captures the relevance of “hours 
constraint” effect of moonlighting in Ghana. A higher probability for engaging 
in moonlighting in response to a decline in working hours could be used to 
measure time-related (or visible) underemployment reflecting willingness and 
availability to work additional hours if  the person had worked for less than the 
normal duration during the period. Introduction of earnings from the primary job 
as another core variable in the model is meant to capture the financial motive for 
engaging in moonlighting such as smoothing household consumption or 
maintaining the standard of living of individuals and households. The effect of 
worker’s employment status in the primary job on the probability of holding 
more than one job is captured in the model in the form of dummies of paid 
employment, self-employment in non-agriculture and self-employment in 
agriculture with contributing family work and other type of employment as the 
default dummy.  
The αi, βi, δi and θi represent vectors of coefficients of the control 
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3.2. Data Sources  
The main data source for the empirical analysis are the fourth and fifth 
rounds of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS4&5) conducted in 1998/99 
and 2005/06. These are nationally representative household surveys conducted over 
a period of twelve months beginning in September. The surveys collect detailed 
information on demographic characteristics of the population, education, health, 
employment and time use, migration, housing conditions, household agriculture 
and household income and expenditure patterns to evaluate the poverty status of 
households. The GLSS4 covered a sample of 5,998 households and 26,411 
individuals yielding average household size of 4.4. The GLSS5 captured a total 
sample of 37,128 individuals and 8,687 households yielding an average household 
size of 4.3. The major difference between the two surveys is the sampling 
framework. While the sampling frame of the GLSS4 was based on the 1984 
population census, the GLSS5 was based on 2000 population census.  
The estimation focuses on employed adults who are 15 years and older. 
Generally, most workers in Ghana live on one job with about 30% in 1998/99 and 
18% in 2005/06 engaged in more than one job (Table 1). A possible explanation for 
this decline is the remarkable expansion of the economy and improved incomes of 
citizens, reflected in a leap of the country from a lower to the entry point of middle 
income status in 2007 and a decline in poverty incidence from 39.5% to 28.5% 
between 1999 and 2006. From the financial motivation perspective of multiple job-
holding, economic growth and improvement in the income of workers may 
invariably reduce their desire to engage in more than one job simultaneously.   
 
Jobs 1998/99 2005/06 
 Male Female Urban Rural All Male Female Urban Rural All 
One 70.1 70.1 80.4 65.5 70.1 82.7 81.6 87.6 79.1 82.1 
Two 28.1 26.6 18.3 31.3 27.3 17.1 18.1 12.2 20.6 17.6 
Three 0.25 0.22 0.15 0.27 0.24 0.17 0.29 0.17 0.26 0.23 
Four 1.59 3.09 1.11 2.97 2.39 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.07 
Observations 4,298 5,151 2,878 6,571 9,449 7,141 7,676 4,956 9,861 14,817 
Table 1: Multiple jobholding by sex and locality in Ghana, 1998/99 and 2005/06 
(%) 
Source: Computed by Authors 
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A lower proportion of employed people in the rural than in urban areas is 
engaged in one job implying that multiple jobholding is higher in rural than in 
urban areas. In 1998/99 even though an equal proportion of male and female 
workers held only one job, the proportion of men who held two or three jobs 
was slightly higher whilst the proportion of women who held four jobs was 
almost double the proportion of men. In 2005/06 the pattern is different. Slightly 
more males than females hold only one job and the proportion of women who 
hold more than one job is higher than men irrespective of the number of jobs 
held. 
 
 1998/99 2005/06 
Variables Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. 
Multiple job-holders (%) 29.9 0 1 17.8 0 1 
Age (in years) 39.12 15 99 38.3 15 99 
Age square 1,740 225 9,801 1,684 225 9,801 
Male (%) 46.5 0 1 48.4 0 1 
Married 55.1 0 1 67.1 0 1 
Basic education (%) 41.8 0 1 51.4 0 1 
Secondary and above (%) 10.2 0 1 10.7 0 1 
Tertiary education (%) 1.2 0 1 2.1 0 1 
Household size (number) 5.2 0 21 5.23 1 29 
Poor (%) 35.7 0 1 25.6 0 1 
Accra (%) 8.6 0 1 11.0 0 1 
Other urban areas (%) 22.5 0 1 25.0 0 1 
Experience in main job (years) --- --- --- 13.0 1 67 
Hours per week in main job 37.7 1 140 39.3 1 143 
Log of nominal monthly earnings 10.9 3.9 17.8 12.7 5.1 19.8 
Wage employment (%) 14.6 0 1 17.5 0 1 
Self-employed non-agriculture (%) 30.1 0 1 25.4 0 1 
Self-employed agriculture  38.6 0 1 34.2 0 1 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Source: Computed by Authors 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of variables in the estimation model 
with an average age of workers of 39 years and 38 years in 1998/99 and 2005/06 
respectively. Males accounted for marginally less than 50% of the sample while 
married people accounts for more than 50% of employed people. Most of the 
employed people have basic education while tertiary education accounts for the 
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lowest proportion with only 10% having entered or completed secondary, 
vocational, technical, nursing or commercial education. In 1998/99 and 2005/06 
between 9% and 11% of the employed were in Accra compared with 22% and 
25% in other urban areas indicating that more than 60% reside in rural areas. 
About 36% and 26% of employed people were poor in 1998/99 and 2005/06 
respectively. The employed people worked 37 and 40 hours a week on average 
in each period with log nominal monthly earnings in the main job of 10 and 13. 
The average number of years of experience in the main job is 13 years. In terms 
of type of employment, less than 20% are engaged in wage employment while a 
greater proportion is working as self-employed in agriculture.  
 
4. Discussion of Empirical Results 
Table iii reports the results of marginal effects of the estimated probit 
model of determinants of moonlighting in Ghana. The statistical significance of 
the Wald Chi2 underscores the joint significance of the control variables in 
determining moonlighting in Ghana. A higher predicted probability at the mean 
of control variables and the value of Pseudo R2 were higher in the earlier period 
of 1998/99 than the latter period of 2005/06.  
The empirical results generally confirm the ‘hours constraint’ motive of 
moonlighting within the leisure-choice model. This is based on the observation 
of a negative marginal effect of the variable that measures hours spent in the 
main job indicating that working less number of hours in the main job increases 
the probability of engaging in more than one job and vice versa. This 
observation is confirmed by a number of studies including Shishko and Rostker 
(1976), and Paxson and Sicherman (1996) who all found primary job hours as 
negatively impacting on moonlighting probabilities.  
The empirical observation of the negative effect of working hours in the 
main job on the worker’s decision to hold an additional job could be used to 
explain the phenomenon of time-related or visible underemployment. Visible 
underemployment is related to the phenomenon of being available and willing to 
work additional hours on account of working less than the normal duration of 
work during the period. Estimates from the GLSS indicate that 65.2% of 
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multiple job-holders (or 18.3% of all workers) in 1998/99 and 55.9% of multiple 
job-holders (or 9.7% of all workers) worked less than 40 hours a week in their 
primary job in 2005/06.2 Thus based on our definition of underemployment a 
sizeable proportion of multiple job holders were visibly underemployed in their 
main job. Therefore, by implication, about 18% and 10% of employment in 
1998/99 and 2005/06 could be considered as underemployment. The remaining 
34.8% and 44.1% of multiple job-holders (or 9.8% and 7.7% of all workers) in 
1998/99 and 2005/06 respectively who worked 40 hours a week or more might 
be participating in moonlighting for other reasons such as acquisition of new 
skills or the need to gain experience in alternative occupations, driven by job 
heterogeneity motive.    
A significant negative effect of earnings in the worker’s main job on the 
probability of engaging in moonlighting is an indication of evidence that 
financial motivation plays an important role in moonlighting decision of 
workers. This observation duly confirms the works of Allen (1998), and 
Krishnan (1990), who all found primary job earnings to negatively impact on the 
probability of moonlighting. Undoubtedly, rational workers would find the need 
to supplement their dwindling earnings from their main job by engaging in an 
additional job.  
The results further indicate that wage employees in the main job are more 
likely to participate in moonlighting relative to contributing family workers and 
those in other type of employment. This outcome may be explained by the need 
for wage workers to diversify their job portfolio, gain experience and skill to 
enhance performance on the main job and the need to completely secure their 
jobs. Also they may not be satisfied with their pay (thus main job does not pay 
enough).  
The results also give evidence to suggest that self-employed (both 
agriculture non-agriculture) in the main job are more likely relative to 
contributing family and other workers to moonlight due possibly to flexibility 
inherent in self-employment. Tansel (1995) observed in Turkey that wage 
                                                            
2  In Ghana, the normal working hours in the formal sector is 8 hours a day and calculating it over five 
working days in a week yield 40 hours a week. 
 
© 2013 The Author(s). African Review of Economics and Finance, Vol 4, No. 2, June 2013. 195 
 
earners are more likely to moonlight than self-employed because whereas wage 
earners are hours constrained, the self-employed are able to adjust their hours on 
the primary main job and therefore less likely to hold a second job. This may be 
consistent with the findings of this study based on stronger marginal effect of 
wage employment than self-employment even though, marginally stronger for 




Marginal effect z-stats Marginal effect z-stats 
Age 0.0193*** 6.48     0.0168*** 8.85 
Age squared –0.0002*** –6.67    –0.0002*** –8.73 
Male† 0.0343** 2.22 0.0122 1.20 
Married† 0.0128 0.88       0.0458*** 4.50 
Basic Education† 0.0221 1.43     0.0212** 2.05 
Secondary education+† –0.0030 –0.11 0.0288* 1.72 
Tertiary education†  0.1002 1.37 –0.0090 –0.29 
No education as reference dummy 
Experience in main job --- --- –0.0002 –0.39 
Accra† –0.3354*** –14.73       –0.2257*** –19.38 
Other urban† –0.1572*** –9.71       –0.1299*** –13.12 
Rural as reference dummy 
Household size    0.0054** 2.19  0.0025  1.61 
Poor –0.0265* –1.72      –0.0540*** –4.87 
Hours worked in main job     –0.0034*** –5.40     –0.0008** –2.05 
Log of monthly earnings in main job –0.0158** –2.50  –0.0058 –1.54 
Wage employment in main job†    0.3923*** 4.37        0.1498*** 4.89 
Self-employed n-agric in main job†    0.3917*** 4.69         0.1452*** 5.17 
Self-employed agric in main job†  0.1855** 2.30  –0.0186 –0.72 
Other employment type as reference dummy# 
     
Predicted probability (at x-bar) 0.3006 0.1725   
Pseudo R2 0.1097 0.1002   
Wald Chi2 429.34*** 655.82***   
Number of observations 9,449 14,817   
Table 3: Marginal Effect of Probit Model of the Determinants of Moonlighting of 
equation (4), 
 
Note: (i) z-statistic corresponds to the test of the underlying coefficient of probit regression being zero; 
(ii) # employment type are contributing family work in agriculture and non-agriculture, domestic employees, 
apprentice and others 
(iii) *** p<0.01     ** p<0.05 * p<0.10 † 
dx
dF for discrete change of dummy variable 
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A lower probability of urban workers in Accra or other urban areas than 
those in rural areas suggests that, being in the urban area tends to decrease the 
probability of an individual participating in moonlighting activities. This may 
confirm the view that unstable income of farming among rural folks is a major 
trigger for workers to engage in moonlighting. This finding is consistent with 
the empirical works of Mather and Scopilliti (2004) that multiple job-holding in 
rural America is triggered by insufficient earnings from farming activity to 
support their families. A justification for this result in the Ghanaian context may 
stem from the fact that rural workers relative to their urban counterparts may 
live in a state of deprivation and underemployed and hence will be in a greater 
disposition to hold secondary jobs as a means of moving out of the deprivation 
and catching up with the status quo. Another reason supporting the deprivation 
factor may be the infrastructural and technological gap that exists between the 
rural and urban worker; hence to better their lot or welfare, rural workers will be 
more predisposed to hold additional jobs. 
The paper also provides evidence to suggest a statistically significant 
effect of personal and household characteristics of the Ghanaian worker on the 
probability of engaging in multiple job-holding. Specifically, the probability of 
engaging in multiple job-holding increases with age based on the positive 
marginal effect in both periods. A negative marginal effect of age squared 
suggests concavity of the relationship between the worker’s probability of 
engaging in moonlighting and age. This implies that the probability of engaging 
in moonlighting assumes an increasing pattern initially and beyond a certain age, 
the probability declines. This is consistent with the findings by Boateng (1996) 
who found among Canadian immigrants and nationals that moonlighting 
possibilities increases with age at younger levels but diminishes with older folks. 
This finding may be explained by the fact that younger people are relatively 
endowed with energy to enable them take up more than one job and be able to 
meet deadlines or work under pressure and odd hours. But as they age, the 
energy factor become no longer relevant and they may experience performance 
decline on the primary job, hence a lower probability of taking on additional 
jobs or moonlighting. 
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Male workers are estimated to have a 3 percentage point higher 
probability compared to females of holding more than one job in 1998/99 and 
this is consistent with Heineck and Schwarze (2004) who found evidence from 
Germany to support the view that women tend to moonlight less than men. It 
also confirms Gaag et.al (1989) who observed that women are less likely to have 
a second job in Cote d'Ivoire and this could be explained by the greater 
responsibility of males than females in the homes. Married workers or those in 
consensual union are also found to have a higher probability than unmarried 
workers to engage in more than one job in 2005/06 and is consistent with 
observation by Owusu (2001). Indeed, marriage places some extra financial and 
social burden on partners creating an incentive to generate additional income 
through moonlighting.  
Additionally, workers with basic or secondary education are observed to 
have a higher probability relative to the uneducated of engaging in moonlighting 
in 2005/06 with no significant effect of tertiary education on the probability of 
engaging in moonlighting. This may be linked to the fact that most workers with 
tertiary education may be engaged at the middle to high echelons of the primary 
job ladder with relatively more responsibilities that keep them glued to the 
primary job. However, the irrelevance of higher education for moonlighting 
appears to be at variance with findings of Tansel (1995) that urban wage earners 
with university education in Turkey are twice as likely as primary school leavers 
to moonlight. Similarly, our observation does not confirm the conclusion 
reached by Foley (1997) that higher education nearly doubles the moonlighting 
probability in Russia. 
Household characteristics of the worker are also found to influence the 
probability of participation in moonlighting in varying directions. As expected, 
individuals from larger households have a higher probability to engage in 
moonlighting in 1998/99 in line with findings of Owusu (2001) suggesting that 
larger households could reflect higher dependency and more financial strain. 
However, contrary to expectation, workers living in poor household are less 
likely to work in more than one job. This observation may be explained by 
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limited search abilities and lower information of the working poor on available 
vacancies and jobs.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
Our analysis of moonlighting suggests that the incidence of moonlighting 
in Ghana is generally high compared to developed countries such as the United 
Kingdom, United States, and Russia and emerging economies such as Brazil. A 
number of factors have been empirically identified to influence moonlighting in 
Ghana key amongst these are the number of working hours, earnings and type of 
employment in the main job, rural location and worker’s age. Specifically, 
individuals in poor households are less likely to moonlight with household size 
having increasing influence on the individual desire to hold more than one job 
while education and age are estimated to have positive effect on individual 
decision to moonlight. Workers in Accra and other urban areas have been found 
to be less likely to desire multiple jobholding relative to their rural counterparts.  
Generally, moonlighting represents a rational and positive choice of 
options available to the individual worker. Evidence is provided to suggest that 
less than sufficient working hours in the main job as a driving force for 
individuals to moonlight confirms the hours constraint motive of holding 
multiple jobs within the utility maximisation framework and could be related to 
the problem of visible underemployment. Besides, the declining probability of 
moonlighting with increasing earnings also explains the financial motive of 
moonlighting. The combination of the hours constraint and financial motives of 
engaging in multiple jobs could suggest that the individual may not have 
sufficient working hours to meet their desired income level. In addition, the 
limited search abilities and lack of information on available job openings of the 
working poor to resort to moonlighting as income improving strategy calls for 
strategies to help the poor in that direction. These observations may be related to 
labour market challenges that require policy intervention. The establishment of 
an efficient labour market information system to facilitate effective job search 
particularly for the poor who may want to resort to multiple job-holding to 
supplement low income from main job is recommended.  
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